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When confronted with important questions we like to rely on the advice of experts.
However, uncertainty can occur regarding advisors’ motivation to pursue self-interest and
deceive the client.This can especially occur when the advisor has the possibility to receive
an incentive by recommending a certain alternative. We investigated how the possibil-
ity to pursue self-interest led to explicit strategic behavior (bias in recommendation and
transfer of information) and to implicit strategic behavior (bias in information processing:
evaluation and memory). In Study 1 explicit strategic behavior could be identified: self-
interested advisors recommended more often the self-serving alternative and transferred
more self-interested biased information to their client compared to the advisor without
specific interest. Also deception through implicit strategic behavior was identified: self-
interested advisors biased the evaluation of information less in favor of the client compared
to the control group. Self-interested advisors also remembered conflicting information
regarding their self-interest worse compared to advisors without self-interest. In Study
2 beside self-interest we assessed accountability which interacted with self-interest and
increased the bias: when accountability was high advisor’s self-interest led to higher explicit
strategic behavior (less transfer of conflicting information), and to higher implicit strategic
behavior (devaluated and remembered less conflicting information). Both studies identified
implicit strategic behavior as mediator which can explain the relation between self-interest
and explicit strategic behavior. Results of both studies suggest that self-interested advi-
sors use explicit and implicit strategic behavior to receive an incentive. Thus, advisors do
not only consciously inform their clients “self-interested,” but they are influenced uncon-
sciously by biased information processing – a tendency which even increased with high
accountability.
Keywords: strategic behavior, deception, self-interest, incentive, advice-giving, motivated information processing,
principal-agent theory
“If you want people to perform better, you reward them, right?
Bonuses, commissions, their own reality show. Incentivize them.”
(Daniel Pink1)
This quote of a well known American career analyst explains
one common strategy of motivating employes in the business
world. It follows a simple analogy: sell or produce X for the
company and you will get Y as a reward. Especially, at a time
where companies are in trouble to survive on the market, they
are challenged to perform well. Taking the competitive nature of
the market into account, it is comprehensible that companies use
incentives as an instrument to motivate employes. Incentives are
assumed to encourage employes in accomplishing a stated goal,
or even in following a goal that they would normally have no
other reason for pursuing. Incentives should help by guiding self-
interested behavior and adjusting the employes’ interests to the
company’s interests.
1Author of “Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us.”
Indeed, there are many examples showing that using incentives
often work out well for companies. One company, which has been
working successfully with incentives, is Tupperware. Their mar-
keting principle of using Tupperware-parties to sell their products
is very effective. These parties take place in the private atmosphere
of someone’s home. The host provides the location, snacks, and
refreshments, and invites the guests. Well, how can that be that a
private person starts a marketing event for a company he or she
does not work for? Back in the 1950s, bringing women together
and discussing housekeeping and kitchen secrets was nothing new,
but receiving additional incentives for hosting the event and for
providing people who buy a lot, was an innovation. Today, the
promise of incentives especially in form of turnover-dependent
commission is still assumed to have a direct impact on peoples’
behavior. The host invites a lot of people, creates a nice surround-
ing atmosphere with sandwiches and drinks because he or she
assumes that this behavior will pay off in the end.
However, the question of interest is whether incentives really
just motivate employes or hosts of Tupperware-parties to behave
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in vein with the company’s strategic interest, or does it lead to
more wide reaching consequences? For the company it is somehow
desirable that the host behaves strategically in order to pursue self-
interest to earn a lot of money. This type of strategic behavior is in
line with the intention to sell a lot. Therefore, the company directs
the hosts’/employes’ behavior by incentives which are adapted to
its own interests. Thus, this type of strategic behavior might also
lead to deceive the other party consciously: for example the host
is recommending especially expensive products to the customers
because he or she receives a turnover-dependent commission. For
this reason, he or she may communicate only the advantages of the
product and withhold the disadvantages (e.g., Buller and Burgoon,
1994, 1996; Steinel and De Dreu, 2004). This behavior is hence-
forth called explicit strategic behavior. Explained more in detail,
people showing strategic behavior can have the explicit goal to
deceive and therefore alter the customer’s behavior or opinion in
order to receive an incentive.
However, we speculate that the promise of incentives could also
entail unconscious risks. In order to gain reward, people might
behave more implicitly strategic which supports the deception of
the other party. Past research already showed that deception is also
accompanied by more automatic and less conscious actions, such
as smiling longer and nodding when deceiving our counterpart in
face-to-face interaction (e.g., Buller and Burgoon, 1994; Burgoon
et al., 1996). However, this is not an explicit strategy to deceive
the other party. People simply seem to implicitly engage in this
deception process. In our opinion, deception can also already start
before the interaction with a counterpart, for example through
biased information processing. This occurs when the host evalu-
ates and remembers expensive products biased in favor of one’s
possibility to receive more reward. We call the biased information
processing henceforth implicit strategic behavior, which in contrast
to explicit strategic behavior is not clearly linked to deception,
because it is not used to alter the client’s behavior or thinking in
order to increase their own incentives. However, we think that it
is triggered by the wish to receive a high incentive and we there-
fore investigate it as an implicit strategic behavior of deceiving the
other party.
As is generally known, the promise of incentives is not only
common practice in occurrences like Tupperware-parties, where
peer-advice is given. Incentives are also widespread in professional
consultancy where advisors have specialized knowledge, which is
demanded by clients to improve their decision (e.g., financial advi-
sors, physicians, and personnel advisors). Clients are in a clear
disadvantage because of their lack of knowledge and advisors can
use these scopes to deceive the client in self-interested manner.
In the current paper we investigate if the promise of incentives
motivates advisors to make consciously use of their advantage
and behave explicitly strategic by deceiving the other party. How-
ever, we assume advisors are also influenced by the incentive more
implicitly, which should display in biased information processing.
This is especially risky and therefore highly relevant for advisors
who prepare information for their clients. So far, past research
did not investigate this type of strategic behavior which might
support the explicit strategic behavior to deceive a counterpart.
We test our assumptions in two studies. Whereas our second
study additionally examines to what extent incentivized advisors
behave strategically when they feel highly accountable for their
clients.
EXPLICIT STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Strategic behavior is primarily used to create a false belief in
order to deceive the other party. One theoretical background of
deception is the Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT, Buller and
Burgoon, 1994, 1996), which focuses primarily on the face-to-
face interaction and the dynamic of deceptive interaction between
sender and receiver (verbal and non-verbal). Buller and Burgoon
(1994) describe observable strategic behavior during the decep-
tion (e.g., ambiguous, vague, and intentional messages), which is
used by the senders to alter the communication in order to achieve
their goal.
An alternative description of deception and strategic behavior
is proposed by the economic principle-agent theory (PAT; Ross,
1973), which focuses less on communication and more on strate-
gic actions within working relationships. According to this theory,
strategic behavior is likely to occur when one party (principal)
delegates work to a more knowledgeable party (agent) and the
two parties have different interests. In other words, the client is
under uncertainty when asking a knowledgeable advisor for sup-
port to find the best solution for a problem, if the advisor really
acts in client’s best interest or in their own interest. Advisors, in
the role of an expert, have wide-ranging possibilities to use scopes
to behave strategically and to pursue their self-interest. The client
lacks the knowledge to fully evaluate the quality of the advisor’s
recommendation. Therefore, the advisor tends to provide recom-
mendations which support their own self-interest rather than the
client’s interest.
Deception and the different levels of knowledge between two
parties were already found as crucial in bargaining experiments
especially when stakes were high (Boles et al., 2000): In this situa-
tion participants in the role of the proposer behaved strategically
by offering less and providing a worse bargain to their unknown
counterpart (who did not know the size of the pie) compared to a
more knowledgeable counterpart. This means proposers pursued
self-interest, when there was a low possibility to be detected by
the counterpart and only when the stakes were high (Boles et al.,
2000).
We would now like to turn to advice-giving situations, where
likewise many opportunities exist to deceive the client. This should
be illustrated with the help of an example of a personnel advisor:
Companies hire a personnel advisor when needing support for a
specific job placement and typically pay him or her with an agency
fee after successful stuffing. This procedure, as typically used by
companies, leads to an incentive for the advisor to find a suitable
candidate as soon as possible in order to fulfill the contract and
to receive the incentive (agency fee). In other words, a fast ful-
fillment of the contract enhances the chances of the advisor to
soon be available for a new contract and a new possibility to earn
money. Thus, for the company and the possible job applicant the
risk exists that the advisor is rather interested in a fast than in the
best job placement (goal conflict). Because of advisor’s informa-
tion advance (e.g., job market, job duties, salary, and education),
he or she can make use of existing scopes and deceive by behav-
ing explicitly strategic. This information asymmetry is existing
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in many advisor–client interactions and similar behavior by the
advisors can be assumed, such as physicians or financial advisors.
According to the PAT (Ross, 1973; for overview Eisenhardt,
1989), in such situations strategic behavior occurs in different
forms, such as “Moral hazard,” withholding actions or informa-
tion (“hidden action,” “hidden information”), and also in terms
of “Hold up” (“hidden intention”), such as concealing the own
goals and intentions. Similarly, IDT (Buller and Burgoon, 1994,
1996) list (explicit) strategic behaviors regarding the regulation
of the content of the spoken information (“information manage-
ment”). Deceivers, for instance, were found to behave strategically
and use higher rates of irrelevant and vague information (Buller
and Burgoon, 1994).
Indeed, further research shows that participants behave strate-
gically by managing and controlling information. For example,
Steinel and De Dreu (2004) found that participants of an infor-
mation provision game behaved strategically. Participants were in
the position to guide their counterpart which had opposing inter-
ests (losing points when the counterpart gain points) through
passing accurate or inaccurate information. The aim of the par-
ticipants was to reach as many points as possible, since these
determined the amount of lottery tickets they would receive in
the end. Results demonstrated that participants behaved explicitly
strategic by withholding more accurate information and passing
more inaccurate one. Additionally the authors could identify that
strategic behavior was mainly driven by greed within this inter-
dependent relationship with opposing interests (Steinel and De
Dreu, 2004).
Looking back at the case of the personnel advisors this means
that the possibility to receive an incentive for recommending a
specific alternative may frequently lead to explicit strategic behav-
ior: the advisor may offer only jobs to applicants which allows a
quick recruitment process with low effort (PAT: “hidden action”).
To achieve this, the advisor may strategically transfer information
to the client to accelerate the process of convincing the client to
accept the easily available job instead of prolonging the search
for the best job alternative. This can occur by solely presenting
those aspects of the easily available job which are in line with the
applicant’s demands (good labor-market situation, career oppor-
tunities) or by withdrawing the conflicting information (salary,
job characteristics) (PAT:“hidden information”and Steinel and De
Dreu, 2004). Based on this assumption we assume the following
hypothesis regarding the explicit strategic behavior:
Hypothesis 1: We assume that the self-interested advisors rec-
ommend the easily available job more often compared to the
advisor without specific interest.
Hypothesis 2: We suppose that self-interested advisors
enhance supporting information and devalue conflicting
information regarding their self-interest whereas advisors
without specific interest do not make this difference.
Well, if these predictions become true they are a large problem
for advice-taking situations, where clients often have to rely on
the knowledge of an advisor as expert. However, past deception
research has only tested the conscious modification of informa-
tion (PAT: Ross, 1973; IDT: Buller and Burgoon, 1996). Heretofore,
it has failed to incorporate the more implicit biasing of the infor-
mation processing within the deception. But we assume that the
motivation to gain reward might influence the advisor even more
implicit.
MOTIVATED DIRECTIONAL GOAL AND IMPLICIT STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR
First, before we fully understand implicit strategic behavior, we
need to describe the process of advice-giving and to differenti-
ate the phase of explicit advice-giving, and the preceding phase
of preparing the recommendation (Jungermann, 1999). Within
the latter one the more implicit information processing has to
be taken into account. In this phase the advisors search, evalu-
ate, and process information. At the latest since Kunda (1990)
we know that there are motives, such as receiving an incentive,
that influence our reasoning. This means people’s goals, wishes,
fears, and desires lead people to engage in biased information
processing and direct our thinking and convictions (Kruglan-
ski, 1989; Kunda, 1990; Dunning, 1999; Kruglanski et al., 2012).
Kruglanski et al. (2012) describes a directional motivation like
a psychological force, similar to a physical force, which is deter-
mined by a specific desired goal. People perceive the world through
their “motivated colored” glasses – perceiver’s goals are crucial for
reconciling incoming information.
Past research provided evidence that such directional goals are
also important for predicting advisors’ behavior in advice-giving
processes (Jonas et al., 2005). This findings indicated that advi-
sors, who had to justify their recommendation and therefore had
an incentive to appear in a positive light in front of the client
(impression motivation), biased their information search in favor
of their recommendation and passed on more information sup-
porting the recommendation (Jonas et al., 2005). In contrast,
advisors without directional goals were found to act accuracy
motivated and were normally directed by finding the best solution
for their clients (Jonas and Frey, 2003). Therefore, only in order
to reach the directional goal, making a good impression, advi-
sors behaved implicitly strategic by searching information which
primarily supported their recommendation.
Implicit strategic behavior can be further illustrated through
the previously introduced example of the personnel advisor, who
has the directional goal of fast contract fulfilling in order to receive
the incentive quickly. An advisor who is preparing a recommen-
dation for a job applicant, always has in mind which jobs are easily
available at the moment and can be staffed quickly, allowing the
advisor to earn more money. In this scenario earning money can
be seen as a main motivation. To reach the directed goal of earning
money, the advisor might behave implicitly strategic when evalu-
ating job information. He or she might evaluate the information
of an easily available job less critical than that of a difficult avail-
able job: the advisor may enhance job relevant information which
is in line with his or her goal. Similarly, the advisor might also
remember information more easily which supports his or her goal
compared to conflicting information. This biased information
processing might also implicitly influence the recommendation
that is given.
Going beyond to the assumption of PAT (Ross, 1973) people’s
motivation to reach a goal do not only lead to an actor’s obvious
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and conscious behavior (e.g., advisors strategic behavior – explic-
itly hiding information). Past research in motivated reasoning sug-
gests that people engage in biased information processes because
they find it more plausible to process information in line with their
own beliefs and expectancies (e.g., McDonald and Hirt, 1997) and
to remember desired aspects (e.g., Sanitioso et al., 1990). These
findings indicated enhanced accessibility of knowledge structures,
which are in line with the desired goal, so that, the personnel
advisor might be caught in biased information processing, when
trying to fulfill the contract quickly in order to receive the incen-
tive. Even when the information processing is not directly and
consciously used to receive an incentive, the personnel advisor
will evaluate and maybe even remember information in favor of
their self-interest. We propose that this phenomenon can be seen
as an implicit and unconscious process – or in other words as
implicit strategic behavior to get the promised incentive.
Interestingly, receiving incentives has already led to different
assumptions regarding information processing and was discussed
controversially in past research. On one hand, there is evidence
that incentives lead to higher accuracy motivation and that peo-
ple put more effort in information processing when receiving an
incentive (Stone and Ziebart, 1995). On the other hand, incentives
can also lead to a higher confirmation bias (Jonas et al., 2008):
Participants who were promised an incentive for finding the cor-
rect answer showed a preference in searching for supportive rather
than conflicting information regarding their preliminary decision.
Moreover, they also remembered conflicting information worse.
This research showed that incentivized participants were more
biased in their information processing than participants without
incentives. This poses the question of whether information pro-
cessing is also biased in order to receive incentives. We assume that
the incentives influence the advisor’s thinking and convictions in a
similar manner as a directional goal. The personnel advisor might
bias information processing in favor of their self-interest, or the
job alternative which is associated with the incentives.
Independent from incentives, other research showed that self-
interest had an influence on the information processing, such as
the evaluation and memory of self-interested information (Kunda,
1990). In a study of Ditto et al. (1998) participants were tested by
means of a clinical test, which had either positive or negative con-
sequences for the participants’ health. Participants had to evaluate
the test and their test results. The results showed that they were
rather dismissive when they were confronted with negative health
consequences, compared to participants who faced a result with a
positive health consequence. Additionally, based on the research
of Kunda and colleagues (e.g., Kunda, 1987; Kunda and Sanitioso,
1989; Sanitioso et al., 1990) we know that our self-interest also
influences our memory search. For instance,participants who were
persuaded that introversion (or extraversion) is more desirable
for academic success described themselves as more introverted
(or extroverted). Furthermore, they were able to report more and
faster introverted (or extroverted) behavior pattern than the par-
ticipants who had been convinced of the opposite (Sanitioso et al.,
1990).
Similar results were found in the field of the persuasion research
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1990) where people’s different involvements
and benefits (vested interest) from actions in society led to different
evaluations of information (outcome-relevant involvement, John-
son and Eagly, 1989). Four experimental studies by Darke and
Chaiken (2005) showed that self-interest influences the direction
of attitudes and the persuasive impact of arguments: participants,
who had to pay the costs and did not receive any benefits, devalued
the new policy (tuition fees) by processing the information of the
arguments in a biased way. In similar vein the research in motivated
skepticism of political beliefs found evidence that people used
biased information processing as means of finding consistency
with their own favored view (Taber and Lodge, 2006). Partici-
pants who felt strongly about an issue – even when encouraged
to be objective – evaluated supportive arguments more favorably
than conflicting arguments. This research indicates that people
in social interactions such as discussing new policies are biased
through their self-interest. They want to bolster their view and
find consistency for the own favored view.
However, this research does not state how people are influenced
by their self-interest when processing information for another
person and preparing an advice. In the present study, we want
to investigate how self-interest in the form of receiving incentives
biases people’s information processing and implicitly influence the
deception in advice-giving. Furthermore, advisors may put more
focus and effort in understanding the match between an appli-
cant and an easily available job compared to other job alternatives,
which may display in a biased memory. We suppose this also in
our following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: We propose that self-interested advisors
enhance the relevance of supporting information and devalue
the conflicting information regarding their self-interest
whereas advisors without specific interest do not make this
difference.
Hypothesis 4: We suppose that self-interested advisors
remember conflicting information regarding their self-
interest worse, than advisors without specific interest.
Finally, it remains the question how implicit and explicit strategic
behaviors are connected and how advisor’s implicit biases shapes
self-serving deceptive behavior. A recent work Shalvi et al. (2011)
assessed deception in participants who were asked to privately roll
a die under a paper cup three times versus only once. Afterward
they reported the outcome of the first roll and gain money as a
function of their reports (1= $1, 2= $2, etc.). Results suggested
that the degree of lying was significant higher in the condition
with three times compared to once rolling the die because of
the higher extent of self-justification by referring to the high-
est outcome of the three rolls. In sum, self-interest led people to
view objective information in a biased way which supported their
self-justification and enabled them to lie. Specifically, the authors
assume that people balance their desire to profit from the lie with a
desire to maintain their self-concept as honest individuals. Similar
in our study, self-interest bias in information processing (implicit
strategic behavior) enables the advisor to justify the later self-
interested explicit strategic behavior. Therefore we propose that
implicit strategic behavior should help to describe the process of
explicit strategic behavior.
Hypothesis 5: We assume that the connection between
self-interest and explicit strategic behavior (transfer of
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information) is mediated to some extent by implicit strategic
behavior (evaluation of information).
PRESENT RESEARCH
In order to assess the outlined hypotheses, in our first study
we asked participants to put themselves in the role of either
self-interested personnel advisor or a personnel advisor without
self-interest. The scenario was similar as already introduced in the
beginning. However, in our second study we want to enhance advi-
sor’s responsibility and accountability for their recommendation.
Therefore, besides self-interest we investigated advisor’s account-
ability and how this influenced explicit and implicit strategic
behavior.
STUDY 1
METHOD
Participants and design
Participants were 67 students (54 female, 13 male) at a public uni-
versity of Austria (University of Salzburg). Psychology students
could volunteer in order to receive credits for participation. They
participated individually. The study was a two factorial design with
two conditions 2(self-interest: yes vs. no)× 2(type of information:
supporting vs. conflicting).
Scenario and task
After participants consented to being in the study, they were placed
in a quiet area. The questionnaire started with the description
of the personnel advisor’s scenario. Part of the scenario was a
fictitious client. He was described as a young male high-school
graduate that is interested in the field of engineering. The advisor
got informed that different tests could already confirm the appro-
priateness of this client in this field and about some important
specific details which should be taken into account for the recom-
mendation (e.g., salary as important criterion, above the average in
logical reasoning, loves challenge in logical thinking, below average
in the ability to work, and cooperate in teams).
Participants assumed either the role of a freelancer personnel
advisor with the possibility to earn an incentive when pursuing
self-interest (self-interested advisor), or a personnel advisor of an
institution for professional training (advisor without specific inter-
est ). Only the self-interested advisor is also under contract of
a company, which commissioned the advisor to find an appro-
priate candidate for the job of a product engineer. Therefore the
advisor could pursue self-interest and receive an incentive by rec-
ommending this job to the client. Participants also pursued real
self-interest – they only participated in lottery to win one of ten
20C-Amazon-voucher if they recommended the product engineer.
In the other condition the advisor had no additional interest to ful-
fill a contract with a company in order to receive an incentive and
also participants themselves took part in the lottery independently
of their recommendation.
The assignment for the career consultant was then to read infor-
mation about three vocational trainings for the client: machinery
engineer, mechatronic engineer, or product engineer. For prepar-
ing the recommendation, the participants had to evaluate the
information. Further they expressed their intention of transfer-
ring information to the client and finally recommended one job.
In the end, the participants answered questions regarding their
perceived self-interest and took part in a quiz regarding the job
information.
MATERIAL
Job information – conflicting and supporting information
Information covered six categories for the three different job pos-
sibilities (see Table A1 in Appendix) and there are clear opposed
interests between the client and the self-interested advisor. On the
one hand, the mechatronic engineer’s job description fitted best
with the client’s demands – it covered most of his needs and wishes
(high salary, logic reasoning is important, and working in teams
is not mentioned as key competence). On the other hand, the
product engineer is the best option for the advisor to meet his/her
self-interest. The information about the machinery engineer were
similar attractive to the product engineer – both had three pieces
of information which covered the wishes of the client and three
which were in conflict.
For further analysis, the pieces of information are used as
either supportive or conflicting with advisor’s self-interest. Con-
flicting information are all information which weaken the real-
ization of the advisor’s self-interested goal (negative arguments
for the product engineer, positive arguments for the mechtronic,
and maschinery engineer). In contrast, supportive information
contains all arguments which can bolster the self-interested rec-
ommendation of the product engineer (positive arguments for
the product engineer, negative arguments for the mechatronic,
and maschinery engineer). We want to refer to Table A1 in
Appendix where we signed supportive arguments for the advi-
sor with plus and conflicting information of information with
minus.
Explicit strategy
Transfer of information. Participants marked on a 10 cm line
how likely they would hand this information to their client. For
further analysis we divided the scale in the transfer of the support-
ing (six items, Cronbach’s α= 0.72) and conflicting information
(11 items, Cronbach’s α= 0.90).
Recommendation. Additionally, after reading all information the
participants had to decide for one specific job – product engineer,
mechatronic engineer, and machinery engineer – which she or he
would recommend to the client.
Implicit strategy
Evaluation of information. The participants in the role of the
advisor had to decide how relevant the job information is. They
marked their evaluation on a 10 cm line which reached from not
relevant to very relevant. For our further analysis we used the eval-
uated relevance of the supporting (six items, Cronbach’s α= 0.83)
and the conflicting information (11 items, Cronbach’s α= 0.85)
regarding the advisor’s self-interest.
Memorizing information. Subsequently the participants were
requested to answer six multiple choice quiz questions regard-
ing information of the three different job alternatives to measure
how much information was memorized. Actually, we used only
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a single-item measure for further analysis; however it is the most
conflicting information regarding the advisor’s self-interest (salary
of the mechatronic engineer).
Manipulation check
Perceived self-interest. Additionally, the perceived own self-
interested behavior was measured with the scales hidden intention
(e.g., “Situations where the client’s and my interests were in con-
flict, I oriented primarily on my interests.” Five items, Cronbach’s
α= 0.92), hidden information (e.g.,“Some important information
were not communicated to the client.” Four items, Cronbach’s
α= 0.83) and hidden action (e.g., “Some actions were more in my
interest than in the interest of the client.” Two items, r(66)= 0.65,
p< 0.01). Participants answered by responding to the questions
on a five-point Likert-scale (1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly
agree). For further analysis we combined these three scales and
measured self-interested behavior in general (11 items, Cronbach’s
α= 0.95).
RESULTS
MANIPULATION CHECK
For checking the influence of the manipulation we used the
scale general perceived self-interest. Analysis regarding the influ-
ence of the manipulated self-interest revealed a main effect,
F(1,67)= 18.17, p< 0.001. The freelancer advisor perceived
him/herself as significant more self-interested compared to the
personnel advisor of an institution for professional training with-
out any specific self-interest (M s= 2.72 vs. 1.84, SDs= 1.09 vs.
0.47). Thus, this result suggests that the intended factors were
manipulated successfully.
EXPLICIT STRATEGIES
Based on the assumption that the advisor is influenced by the
promise to receive an incentive in a self-interested manner, we
expected an explicit strategic behavior in the explicit recom-
mendation to the client and in the transfer of information. The
self-interested transfer of information should be characterized
by withholding conflicting information regarding the self-interest
and pushing forward supporting information.
Advice-giving – Hypothesis 1
In line with our first hypothesis a Chi-squared test on advice-giving
strategy displayed that participants in the role of self-interested
freelancer advisor recommended significant more often the less
appropriate option “product engineer” to their client than partic-
ipants without self-interest, χ2(1, N = 67)= 8.49, p= 0.04 (self-
interest: 10 product engineer, 24 no product engineer; without
self-interest: 1 product engineer, 32 no product engineer). The
result supported our assumption that participants who had a
personal self-interest are influenced in advice-giving and recom-
mended significantly more often the product engineer, which is
the self-interested alternative for the advisor. Additionally, Chi-
squared analysis with all three job alternatives showed that advisors
with no specific interest recommended more often the optimal
job to their client (“mechatronic engineer”) than participants
with self-interest, χ2(1, N = 67)= 8.61, p= 0.014 (without self-
interest: mechatronic 30, product 1, machinery 2 vs. self-interest:
mechatronic 23, product 10, machinery 1). These results sup-
port our hypothesis that self-interested advisors recommend the
self-interested alternative of the product engineer more often com-
pared to advisors without specific interest. Additionally advisors
without specific interest recommended the optimal job more often
than those with self-interest.
Transfer of information – Hypothesis 2
To test this hypothesis we ran a 2 (self-interest: yes vs. no)× 2
(information: supporting vs. conflicting) analysis of variance
with repeated measures on the last factor. This analysis revealed
no main effect for the information, F(1,65)= 1.91, p= 0.17,
η2p = 0.029 (supporting: M = 7.62, SD= 1.48 vs. conflicting:
M = 7.30, SD= 1.89). However, the analysis displayed a signifi-
cant interaction effect between job information and self-interest,
F(1,65)= 13.50, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.17. Subsequent post hoc analy-
sis indicated that results are in line with our predictions: Partici-
pants in the in the role of the self-interested advisor transferred less
conflicting information (M = 6.64, SD= 2.23) than the advisor
without specific interest (M = 7.97, SD= 1.16), F(1,65)= 9.20,
p= 0.003. Additionally, self-interested advisors passed significant
more information which supported their self-interest to the client
than information which conflicted their self-interest (M = 7.81,
SD= 1.54 vs. M = 6.65, SD= 2.23), F(1,65)= 12.98, p= 0.001.
There was a tendency that advisors without specific interest
transferred even less supporting than conflicting information
(M = 7.44, SD= 1.41 vs. M = 7.97, SD= 1.55), F(1,65)= 1.04,
p= 0.112. Regarding the supporting information there was no
significant difference between advisors with self-interest and
without specific self-interest (M = 7.81, SD= 1.54 vs. M = 7.44,
SD= 1.41) F(1,65)= 1.04, p= 0.311. This indicates that advi-
sors with self-interest primarily withhold conflicting information
and did not transfer more supporting, whereas advisors without
specific interest transferred information more balanced – with a
contrary tendency to transfer more conflicting than supporting
information. Results are displayed in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 | Mean differences representing the transfer of information
regarding supportive and conflicting information for advisors with
self-interest and without self-interest. The error bars represent SEM
(study1).
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FIGURE 2 | Mean differences representing the evaluation of
information regarding supportive and conflicting information for
advisors with self-interest and without self-interest. The error bars
represent SEM (study 1).
IMPLICIT STRATEGIES
Well, besides explicitly strategic advice-giving we predict that advi-
sor’s information processing is also influenced by incentives. The
promise of incentives leads to self-interested bias in the evaluation
of information and in memorizing the information (supporting
vs. conflicting information regarding advisor’s self-interest).
Evaluation of information – Hypothesis 3
To examine the effect of the self-interest on the evaluation of the
information, we ran a 2 (self-interest: yes vs. no)× 2 (information:
conflicting vs. supporting) analysis of variance with repeated mea-
sures on the last factor. This analysis revealed no main effect for
the information, F(1,65)= 0.67, p= 0.42, η2p = 0.10 (conflicting:
M = 7.90, SD= 1.16 vs. supporting: M = 7.82, SD= 1.44). How-
ever, it showed a significant interaction effect between job infor-
mation and self-interest, F(1,65)= 4.97, p= 0.029, η2p = 0.07.
Post hoc analysis verified the pattern that there was a tendency
for supporting information to be higher evaluated by the self-
interested advisor than by the advisor without special interest
(M = 8.09, SD= 1.41 vs. M = 7.53, SD= 1.43), F(1,65)= 2.57,
p= 0.114. In contrast, the conflicting information was evalu-
ated similarly in its relevance by the self-interested advisor and
the advisor without interest (M = 7.93, SD= 1.30 vs. M = 7.87,
SD= 1.02), F(1,65)= 0.04, p= 0.835. However, advisors without
specific self-interest devaluated supporting information signifi-
cant compared to conflicting information (M = 7.53, SD= 1.43,
vs. M = 7.87, SD= 1.02), F(1,65)= 4.56, p= 0.036; advisors with
self-interest did not evaluate supporting and conflicting informa-
tion significantly different (M = 8.09, SD= 1.41, vs. M = 7.93,
SD= 1.30), F(1,65)= 1.01, p= 0.318. The hypothesis gets sup-
port by the significant interaction between self-interest and type
of information, whereas the interaction is mainly driven by the
enhanced evaluation of the conflicting information compared to
the supporting information within advisors without specific inter-
est. It seems that this distinction regarding the evaluation of the
information disappears when pursuing self-interest. Results are
displayed in Figure 2.
FIGURE 3 |The relationship between self-interest and remembering
conflicting information as a function of the evaluation of conflicting
information (study 1).
Memorized information – Hypothesis 4
Further, we tested the influence of self-interest on the memorized
information. The results indicated that self-interested participants
remembered significantly worse that the mechatronic engineer
had the best possibilities to receive a good salary (conflicting infor-
mation), t (65)= 2.00, p= 0.05 (self-interest M = 3.79, SD= 0.59;
without self-interest M = 4.00, SD= 0.00). Really remarkable was
that each participant without specific could remember the correct
answer.
For further exploratory analysis of our data we used the
pursued self-interest2 together with the devaluation of con-
flicting information to predict biased memorized information
(salary of the mechatronic engineer). We conducted a hierar-
chical regression analysis in which memorized conflicting infor-
mation was predicted by main-effect terms (evaluation of the
conflicting information and self-interest) and the interaction
term simultaneously. Following Aiken and West (1991), the vari-
ables evaluation of conflicting information and self-interest were
centered (i.e., by subtracting the mean from each score), and
the interaction term was based on these centered scores. The
interaction between evaluation of the conflicting information
and self-interest was significant, b= 0.32, SE= 0.10 t (63)= 3.18,
p= 0.002. Simple slope analysis was conducted to further ana-
lyze this interaction (Aiken and West, 1991). When the rele-
vance of the conflicting information was high (1 SD above the
mean), self-interest was not significantly related to memorized
information, b= 0.22, SE= 0.16, t (63)= 1.39, p= 0.170, which
means among participants who evaluated conflicting information
high self-interest had no specific influence on the memorized
knowledge. However, when the relevance of conflicting infor-
mation was evaluated low (1 SD below the mean; b=−0.43,
SE= 0.15 t (63)=−2.91, p= 0.005), self-interest was associated
with less memorized information. The slopes are plotted in
Figure 3.
2The scale perceived self-interest of the manipulation check was used.
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Mediation – Hypothesis 5
We assumed that the connection between self-interest and explicit
strategic behavior can be explained to some extent by implicit
strategic behavior. Therefore we conducted a mediation model
with the implicit strategic behavior (evaluation of conflicting
information) as a potential mediator, which should help to
explain the relation between self-interest and explicit strategic
behavior (transfer of conflicting information). The first regres-
sion analyses showed that self-interest was significantly asso-
ciated with the potential mediator implicit strategic behavior,
b=−0.31, SE= 0.12, t (67)=−2.59, p= 0.012. In the second
step we tested whether implicit strategic behavior was signifi-
cantly associated with the explicit strategic behavior – and indeed,
implicit strategic behavior significantly predicted the explicit
strategic behavior, b= 0.38, SE= 0.06, t (67)= 6.10, p< 0.001.
In the final step we examined whether statistical control for the
potential mediator reduced the predictive power of the rela-
tion between self-interest and explicit strategic behavior. With-
out the mediator the effect was significant, b=−0.80, SE= 0.08,
t (67)=−10.68, p< 0.001, however, when controlling for the
mediator the relationship was considerably reduced, b=−0.68,
SE= 0.06, t (67)=−10.83, p< 0.001. Finally, in a bootstrap analy-
sis implicit strategic behavior significantly carried the indirect
effect, 95% CI=−0.24 to −0.02. Thus, evidence was found that
the direct effect of self-interest on the explicit strategic behav-
ior occurred partly through the implicit strategic behavior, which
supports our Hypothesis 5.
DISCUSSION STUDY 1
Our results indicate that advisors with self-interest behaved explic-
itly strategic by recommending the self-interested alternative of
the product engineer more often compared to advisors without
specific interest. The self-interested advisor also transferred less
conflicting than supporting information to the client, as well as
self-interested advisors transferred less conflicting information
compared to advisors without self-interest.
Self-interested advisors also behaved implicitly strategic. The
evaluation of information led in advisors without specific interest
to a significant enhanced evaluation of the conflicting information
(supporting for the client, see Table A1 in Appendix) compared
to the supporting information (conflicting for the client). This
pattern displays the evaluation of information when having the
best interest of the client in mind. The significant differenti-
ation disappeared in advisors with self-interest. They did not
take the perspective of the client and his needs and therefore,
evaluated conflicting and supporting as similar important. Fur-
thermore, we could confirm direct influence of self-interest on
advisors’ biased memory. However, the investigation should be
improved in Study 2, because in Study 1 we could only refer
to one quiz question. Additionally, we could identify evaluation
of conflicting information as moderator. Especially when the
relevance of conflicting information was devalued self-interest
had a significant negative influence on memorizing conflicting
information.
With regard to the mediation analysis we found important
evidence for the connection between implicit and explicit strate-
gic behavior. Our results indicate that implicit strategic behavior
can partly explain the relation between self-interest and explicit
strategic behavior. This finding supports our assumptions that
incentives have profound effects which influence people more
implicitly and not only explicitly as assumed by the usual practice
of incentives.
STUDY 2
In study 1 our hypotheses received support from the experimental
data which indicated that advisors with self-interest deceived the
client by explicit and implicit strategic behavior. However, because
of the hypothetical nature of the experiment participants of Study
1 could not get the impression that their advice would really help
or harm a real client. Because of this lack of accountability the
results of Study 1 could have been overestimated. Further clarifi-
cation therefore is needed. In order to do this, we would like to
more carefully look at the concept of accountability. Accountabil-
ity is an expectation (implicit or explicit) that one may be called
on to justify ones actions to others (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). In
practice, advisors are in this situation to justify their recommenda-
tion and action. But how does enhanced accountability influence
advisor’s self-interested behavior?
One assumption could be that enhanced accountability leads to
reduced self-interested behavior and consequently reduced explicit
and implicit strategic behavior. Research findings can indicate that
persons who are asked to justify their decisions are more likely to
be interested in others outcomes. People with high endowment
but having no accountability for group members contributed the
same amount to a common system compared to those with few
endowments. However, when they were accountable they made
higher payments which helped in social dilemma situations (De
Cremer and Van Dijk, 2009).
However, based on the review of Lerner and Tetlock (1999) we
know it is especially necessary to take a closer look on the condi-
tions of accountability. This review identified different conditions
where accountability led to diverse outcomes in decision mak-
ing and especially identified outcome vs. process accountability
as crucial in this context (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Especially
when people had to justify their outcome, such as their recom-
mendation, they tended to increase their need of self-justification
as well as biased information processing (e.g., Simonson and Staw,
1992). Contrarily accountability for decision processes led to more
balanced evaluation when confronted with different alternatives.
Consequently, advisors’ perceived accountability for their deci-
sion and expected need to justify this outcome should also lead to
enhanced bias in information processing.
An additional closer look on the conditions for accountabil-
ity in advice-giving situation is provided by research of Jonas
et al. (2005). This study investigated the information search and
transfer of highly accountable advisors (who assumed to meet
the client and have to justify the recommendation) compared to
advisors without accountability for their decision. This research
found an enhanced confirmation bias for advisors’ binding recom-
mendation when they were highly accountable for their decision
but not in advisors without accountability. This effect could be
explained by the directional goal of impression motivation. This
means advisors wanted to appear in a positive light and therefore
searched and also transferred primarily that information which
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was in line with their preliminary decision. This strategy helped
them to provide evidence for their recommendation which sup-
ported their wish to present themselves in a positive way in front
of their clients.
When referring to a self-interested advisor who has the direc-
tional goal to earn money we know already from Study 1 that
they will evaluate and transfer information in a biased way in
order to favor their self-interest. They also provide mainly infor-
mation for their self-interested recommendation. However, how
do advisors process information when they perceive themselves
as both self-interested as well as highly accountable? We know
from Study 1 that self-interested advisors who feel motivated
by the goal to receive an incentive commit themselves already
with the self-interested alternative before searching, evaluating
and transferring information. In Study 1 this led to a bias in
explicit and implicit strategic behavior. The perception of high
accountability for their decision might increase the advisors’
wish to bolster their view. However, the salience of account-
ability might also counteract and reduce the self-interested bias
in participants. Yet, given former research this latter alternative
seems unlikely because being accountable for an outcome, such
as a recommendation, has been shown to increase bias in infor-
mation processing. Similarly, the presence of a directional goal
(impression motivation) has also been shown to increase bias
in information processing and information transfer. In Study
2 we investigate the influence of combining the presence of
perceived accountability with self-interest on biased informa-
tion processing and transfer. Therefore we tested the following
hypotheses:
Explicit strategic behavior
Hypothesis 6 – Transfer of information: We suppose espe-
cially among accountable participants, that self-interested advisors
transfer less conflicting information compared to advisors without
self-interest, this difference should be weaker within participants
who are not accountable.
Implicit strategic behavior
Hypothesis 7 – Evaluation of information: We assume among
accountable participants, that self-interested advisors devalue con-
flicting information compared to advisors without self-interest,
this difference should be weaker within participants who are not
accountable.
Hypothesis 8 – Memory of information: Again we suppose
especially among accountable participants, that self-interested
advisors remember conflicting information less compared to advi-
sors without self-interest, this difference should be weaker within
participants who are not accountable.
Moderated mediation
Hypothesis 9 – Transfer of information: We propose the indi-
rect effect of self-interest on explicit strategic behavior (transfer
of conflicting information) through implicit strategic behavior
(evaluation of conflicting information) would be stronger under
high than low accountability because accountability moderates the
relation between self-interest and the mediator implicit strategic
behavior.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
Participants were 53 students (36 female, 17 male) at a public uni-
versity of Austria (University of Salzburg). The present study took
place after a social psychology lecture. Psychology students could
volunteer in order to receive credits for participation. The proce-
dure in this experiment was similar to Study 1, with the following
exception that we tried to manipulate accountability through the
following sentence: “Please leave your e-mail address (on an extra
sheet), so that the client can contact you for further questions.”The
condition without accountability did not have this sentence in the
questionnaire. Unfortunately our attempt to additionally manip-
ulate accountability failed, F(3,53)= 0.36, p= 0.552. The survey
took place in a huge lecturer hall where our manipulation was to
weak. Although, the manipulation of self-interest was successful,
F(3,53)= 3.16, p= 0.018, we use perceived self-interest and per-
ceived accountability for further analysis. We discuss this decision
later with our findings.
MEASURES
Explicit strategic behavior
Again, we measured the intention to transfer information to the
client, but used this time a five-point Likert-scale (unlikely to very
likely). We used conflicting information (Cronbachs’α= 0.75)
regarding self-interest for further analysis.
Implicit strategic behavior
For the evaluation of the information we applied a five-point
Likert-scale (not relevant to very relevant). Conflicting informa-
tion (Cronbachs’α= 0.67) regarding self-interest (see Table A1 in
Appendix) is used for our further analysis. Further, we imple-
mented a quiz to measure the memorized information, but we
increased the amount of questions from 6 to 11. For further
analysis we used only the conflicting information (six items,
e.g., career opportunities for the mechatronic engineer, product
engineer’s problems with the labor market) plus one question
where participants had to remember the amount of salary of
the mechatronic engineer. However, this question had no cor-
rect answer alternative – there was an optimistic (more than
30,000C per year) vs. two rather pessimistic (not even 30,000C,
at the best 30,000C per year) and one neutral (approximately
30,000C per year) biased alternative. For our conflicting infor-
mation scale we added the optimistic alternative as correct
answer.
Perceived self-interest
Similar to Study 1 we combined the three subscales of hidden
intention, hidden information and hidden action and used one
general scale of self-interested behavior for further analysis (nine
items, Cronbachs’α= 0.91).
Perceived accountability
In the past research accountability was often manipulated through
justification in front of a real audience. In our case we did not have
real audience but some of the participants assumed further contact
with the client per e-mail (attempt of manipulation). However, this
typical accountability situation should be represented through our
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two questions which measures perceived accountability. (“How
realistic was the situation to give advice to another person?”
and “How accountable did you feel for your advice?” two items;
r = 0.40, p< 0.01).
RESULTS
EXPLICIT STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Transfer of Information – Hypothesis 6
We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which the
transfer of conflicting information was conducted by perceived
accountability and perceived self-interest (main-effect terms) and
the interaction term simultaneously. Following Aiken and West
(1991), the variables accountability and self-interest were cen-
tered (i.e., by subtracting the mean from each score), and the
interaction term was based on these centered scores. The inter-
action between accountability and self-interest was significant,
b=−0.14, SE= 0.06, t (49)=−2.25, p= 0.029, and as well a main
effect for self-interest revealed significance, b=−0.34, SE= 0.08,
t (49)=−4.25, p< 0.001. Simple slope analysis was conducted to
further analyze the interaction (Aiken and West, 1991). When
accountability was low (1 SD below the mean), self-interest was
significantly negative related to the transfer of conflicting informa-
tion, b=−0.20, SE= 0.08, t (49)=−2.37, p= 0.022. Therefore
participants with low accountability were significantly influenced
by their self-interest and passed on less conflicting information.
However, when accountability was perceived high (1 SD above
the mean; b=−0.49, SE= 0.12, t (49)=−4.08, p< 0.001), the
relation between self-interest and less transfer of conflicting infor-
mation even increased, which means an enhanced bias when
accountability was high. However, the bias already existed when
accountability was low, but high accountability increased the bias
significantly.
Additional data analysis showed, that this effect was similarly
found regarding the general transfer of information (all infor-
mation – conflicting and supportive), which indicates that among
highly accountable advisors self-interest led to general withholding
information [self-interest× accountability: b=−0.17, SE= 0.69,
t (49)=−2.54, p= 0.015, 1 SD above: b=−0.60, SE= 0.13,
t (49)=−4.66, p> 0.001, 1 SD below: b=−0.25, SE= 0.09,
t (49)=−2.77, p> 0.001]. These results provided evidence that
among advisors with high accountability, especially high self-
interest led to withhold of conflicting information, which sup-
ports our Hypothesis 6. Moreover, our results indicate that self-
interested advisors withhold general information and provide less
information to their clients as advisors without self-interest. In
other word self-interested advisors with high accountability do
not distinguish between conflicting and supporting information
and withhold information in general. The slopes are plotted in
Figure 4.
IMPLICIT STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
Information evaluation – Hypothesis 7
To test the perceived accountability as moderator between
self-interest and the evaluation of conflicting information, we
applied the same approach as already explained. The inter-
action between accountability and self-interest was margin-
ally significant, b=−0.10, SE= 0.05, t (49)=−1.93, p= 0.060.
Simple slope analysis was conducted to further analyze this
interaction (Aiken and West, 1991). When accountability was
low (1 SD below the mean), self-interest was not signifi-
cantly related to the evaluation of conflicting information,
b= 0.04, SE= 0.10, t (49)= 0.53, p= 0.596, in other words self-
interest had no specific influence on the evaluation of con-
flicting information. However, when accountability was eval-
uated high [1 SD above the mean; b=−0.16, SE= 0.10,
t (49)=−1.70, p= 0.097], self-interest was associated nega-
tively with evaluated conflicting information. These results
indicate that self-interested people under high accountability
devaluate information compared to low self-interested partic-
ipants, whereas participants with low accountability showed
a similar level of devaluation regarding conflicting informa-
tion. Therefore, these results do not suppose an enhanced bias
compared to low accountability, however an enhanced bias
between low and high self-interest among high accountability
which supports the Hypothesis 7. The slopes are plotted in
Figure 5.
FIGURE 4 |The relationship between self-interest and transferring
conflicting information as a function of advisor’s perceived
accountability (study 2).
FIGURE 5 |The relationship between self-interest and evaluation of
conflicting information as a function of advisor’s perceived
accountability (study 2).
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FIGURE 6 |The relationship between self-interest and remembering
conflicting information as a function of advisor’s perceived
accountability (study 2).
Remembered information – Hypothesis 8
Accountability should be also tested as moderator between self-
interest and the memorized conflicting information. We con-
ducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which the memorized
conflicting information was predicted by main-effect terms (per-
ceived accountability and perceived self-interest) and the interac-
tion term simultaneously. There was a significant main effect for
self-interest, b=−0.04, SE= 0.01, t (49)=−2.52, p= 0.015 and
the interaction between accountability and self-interest was mar-
ginally significant, b=−0.02, SE= 0.01, t (49)=−1.75, p= 0.086.
Simple slope analysis was conducted to further analyze this inter-
action (Aiken and West, 1991). When accountability was low (1
SD below the mean), self-interest was not significantly related
to memorized information, b= 0.02, SE= 0.02, t (49)=−1.09,
p= 0.283, which imply when participants perceived themselves
as less accountable self-interest had no specific influence on mem-
ory of conflicting information. However, when accountability
was perceived high [1 SD above the mean; b=−0.06, SE= 0.02,
t (49)=−2.64, p= 0.011], self-interest was associated significant
negatively with memorized information. Therefore, among advi-
sors with high accountability and high self-interest showed the
worst memory regarding conflicting information. Accountabil-
ity can be identified as marginal significant moderator which
increases the self-interested bias in memorized conflicting infor-
mation and therefore supports our Hypothesis 8. The slopes are
plotted in Figure 6.
Moderated mediation – Hypothesis 9
We employed Preacher et al. (2007) (Model 2) bootstrapping
procedure to test our moderated mediation hypothesis that the
indirect effect of self-interest on explicit strategic behavior (trans-
fer of conflicting information) through implicit strategic behavior
(evaluation of conflicting information) would be stronger under
high than low accountability because accountability moderates
the relation between self-interest and implicit strategic behavior.
As we already know the moderated regression analysis confirmed
a marginal significant interaction between accountability and
self-interest on implicit strategic behavior (see above Hypothe-
sis 7). Using 1000 resample, analyses showed that implicit strategic
behavior significantly mediated the effect of perceived self-interest
on explicit strategic behavior under high accountability (90% CI:
−0.25 to−0.01) but not under low accountability (90% CI: -0.04
to 0.11).
DISCUSSION STUDY 2
Our results indeed showed an interaction between self-interest
and accountability indicating that high accountability enhanced
the effect between self-interest and explicit (transfer of conflicting
information) as well as implicit strategic behavior (evaluation and
memory of conflicting information). More specific, we found that
self-interested advisors increased their explicit strategic behavior
by withholding information in general, but high accountability
in advisors without self-interest led even to a reduced bias. This
mean only the combination of high self-interest and high account-
ability led to increase in self-interested bias. This interaction was
also found regarding implicit strategic behavior. Self-interested
participants devaluated conflicting information only when they
perceived themselves as highly accountable. High accountability
without self-interest also led again to a reduced bias. Referring
to the memory performance, self-interested advisors showed gen-
erally decreased performance regarding conflicting information.
However, performance was especially decreased when they also
perceived themselves as accountable for the given recommenda-
tion. Our moderated mediation analysis indicated that the relation
between advisor’s self-interest and the explicit strategic behavior
(reduced transfer of conflicting information) can be explained
by implicit strategic behavior (devaluation of conflicting infor-
mation). But this was only the case when accountability was
high – which confirm accountability again as moderator.
Unfortunately, findings of Study 2 do not exactly replicate
findings of Study 1 (self-interest× type of information). One
reason is that in participants with the concern of accountability
higher responsibility was salient (attempt of manipulation), which
weakened the effect regarding the experimental self-interest and
participants did not differentiate between conflicting and sup-
porting information as strong as in Study 1. However, we found
convincing findings which showed that participants with high per-
ceived accountability and without self-interest behave especially
responsible for their clients regarding conflicting information –
they increased transfer and evaluation of conflicting information.
Thus, under high accountability without self-interest participant
showed especially responsible for the client. But in combination
with self-interest, the advisors acted in an even more self-interested
way – they withhold and devalue information conflicting with
their self-interest. These findings underline in our opinion the
weakening effect of the self-interest manipulation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research examined the effect of incentives on two dif-
ferent forms of strategic behavior. Within two studies we could
show that the promise to receive an incentive led to deception
through explicit as well as implicit strategic behavior. The aim of
Study 1 was to investigate the consequences of self-interest regard-
ing information which are in conflict or in support with the self-
interest. The results provided twofold evidence for explicit strategic
behavior : firstly, self-interested advisors explicitly recommended
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the self-serving job option more often compared to those without
specific interest. Secondly, we could observe that advisors passed
on more supporting information and withhold more conflicting
information from their clients compared to participants with-
out self-interest. In Study 2, we measured beside self-interest also
advisors’ perceived accountability. Our results indeed showed an
interaction between self-interest and accountability regarding the
transfer of conflicting information. In other words, we found that
self-interested advisors increased their explicit strategic behav-
ior by withholding conflicting information compared to advisors
without self-interest when accountability was high. This was not
the case when accountability was low.
Our findings regarding the explicit strategic behavior were in
line with the described strategic behavior of PAT (Ross, 1973)
which especially predicts “hidden information” as potential risk
in relationships where information is distributed asymmetrically
and the two parties have conflicting goals. Similar, Steinel and
De Dreu’s (2004) findings showed that participants were less
accurate when confronted with a competitive counterpart with
opposed interests. However, our self-interested participants used
withholding conflicting information and passing on supporting
information as method to pursue self-interest and to bolster the
self-interested decision. Similar in the study of Steinel and De
Dreu (2004) this behavior could be observed to primarily hand-
icap the other person and to enrich oneself. Our results indicate
that advisors are motivated by the possibility to receive an incentive
and therefore transfer information strategically and give strategic
recommendation.
Furthermore, we provide evidence for implicit strategic behav-
ior, which has so far not been investigated in past research. Thus,
it is highly relevant to look at deception in its entirety – this means
beside deception as explicit behavior also as bias in information
processing. Referring to our results self-interested advisors were
biased implicitly which again could be identified twofold: firstly,
participants with self-interest evaluated information less in favor
of clients’ needs compared to the control group. The interaction
effect between self-interest and the information type (supporting
vs. conflicting regarding self-interest) showed that advisors with-
out self-interest wanted to find the best solution for the client and
therefore enhanced evaluation of the conflicting information (sup-
porting for the client) compared to the supporting information
(conflicting for the client). This pattern disappeared in advisors
with self-interest, who seemed not to take the perspective of the
client and his needs into account. Secondly, self-interested advi-
sors even remembered highly conflicting information worse than
advisors without self-interest. Interestingly, the biased memory
performance can also be explained by the evaluation of conflicting
information. Among those participants who especially devalued
the conflicting information in advance, high self-interest could
significantly predict the bad memory regarding the conflicting
information. This means Study 1 could provide first interesting
evidence for implicit strategic behavior.
However, in Study 2 the interaction between self-interest and
accountability was beside explicit strategic behavior also found in
implicit strategic behavior. More specific, we stated in our analysis
that self-interested advisors decreased the evaluation of conflict-
ing information compared to advisors with low self-interest when
accountability was high. There was no difference between high
and low self-interest when accountability was low. Regarding
memory performance of conflicting information also only high
accountable participants showed a significant difference between
high and low self-interest. Self-interested with high accountability
could remember conflicting information worse. Taken together,
our results supported the importance of implicit strategic behav-
ior. Deception in advice-giving situation is also driven by biases in
information processes like evaluating and remembering informa-
tion which is even increased when accountability is high.
Our results regarding the implicit strategic behavior provide
further support for Kunda’s (1990) assumption of biased infor-
mation processing in favor of one’s wishes and desires – or in
the current study to earn the incentive and pursue self-interest.
So far, research provided evidence for self-interested participants
to devalue arguments as less persuasive when its content was
against their self-interest (Darke and Chaiken, 2005). We could
additionally provide evidence that the self-interested information
evaluation interacted with self-interest and led to worse memory
performance regarding conflicting information. This means that
especially those who devalued already conflicting information in
advance remembered this information worse. In other words, these
results suggested that bias in memory arises especially when infor-
mation is not compatible with the self-interest and is evaluated
therefore more negatively.
The findings of Study 2 additionally indicate the enhanced
influence of self-interest on strategic behavior when accountabil-
ity is high. So far past research showed under high accountability
advisors’ search was more confirmation based and in line with
preliminary decision (Jonas et al., 2005). And this research also
identified impression motivation as directional goal why people
are motivated to bias information. Our current results provided
evidence that receiving an incentive function as a directional
goal and led to a bias. The combination of high self-interest and
high accountability enhanced this bias and led to a higher extant
of strategic behavior. Highly accountable advisors seem to bias
their information transfer in order to convince the client of the
self-interested alternative.
Interestingly, in both studies we could confirm that implicit
strategic behavior can predict to some extent explicit strate-
gic behavior. Our mediation analysis indicated that the relation
between advisor’s self-interest and the explicit strategic behav-
ior (reduced transfer of conflicting information) can be explained
by implicit strategic behavior (devaluation of conflicting informa-
tion). In Study 2 this was also the case but only when accountability
was high – which highlighted accountability as moderator again.
Both mediation analyses are nice evidence that implicit actions
explain partly the process of explicit strategic behavior. In other
words, advisors might to some extent deceive themselves through
biased information processing to justify their explicit strategic
behavior afterward. The interesting findings of Shalvi et al. (2011)
support this view: they found that the degree of lying depends on
the extant of possible self-justification which participants emerge
through biased information processing. This means in our study
that especially the implicit strategy (the devaluation of conflicting
information) justifies in turn the explicit strategic behavior (with-
holding of conflicting information). According to these results we
must suppose that the promise of incentives can lead advisors to
implicit strategic behavior which in turn leads to explicit strategic
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behavior. We have to take implicit actions more into account
in order to understand explicit strategic behavior and decep-
tion. We will discuss especially the implications of this finding
later.
Additionally to past research our results provide important
evidence of the implicit strategic behavior which shows that advi-
sors are influenced by their evaluation and memory. These are
processes which advisors themselves can hardly control. For-
mer research of such implicit processes also defined the term
“directed forgetting” which especially explains reduced retrieval
of unwanted memories or information (e.g., Freud, 1900/1964).
However, this phenomenon should not lead to permanent dam-
age of the information. Therefore, for future research it would be
essential not only to test the recall of information but also if it can
be recognized again (for overview: Baddeley et al., 2009). A further
implicit phenomenon is the attention and which might be also
directed through our motives. Isaacowitz (2006) exactly discuss
this and describes attention as a tool of motivation. Eye-tracking
studies provide some evidence that people are often strategic in
their attentional preference and he assumed that “people guide
their attention to information that can help them to achieve their
goals and put away from stimuli that will not” (Isaacowitz, 2006,
p. 68). Bias in attention might be also relevant in our study where
especially self-interested participants could have used their atten-
tion as tool to guide their self-interested intention. For future
research, especially eye-tracking studies can help us to understand
how much attention self-interested participant pay to supporting
vs. conflicting information and with how much effort they try to
understand the match between the applicant and the different job
alternatives.
With regard to theoretical implications, these findings iden-
tified a new aspect of advice-giving, because strategic behavior
and deception was hardly discussed in advisor–client research
(for overview: Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006). Although we know
that clients accept and use advice of self-interested advisors to a
lesser extent compared to advisors without specific interest (Jodl-
bauer and Jonas, 2011) and that besides advisor’s expertise and
confidence also advisor’s good intention is highly relevant when
evaluating the advisor’s recommendation quality (Bonaccio and
Dalal, 2009). One exception is the research of Van Swol (2009)
who manipulated two different motives – persuasion vs. quality –
during the advice-giving process and could show that advisor’s
motive to persuade manifested in using a high public confidence
rating. They did that in a strategic way to convince the client
because the private confidence rating differed significantly. Inter-
estingly this attempt was successful in order to pursue clients.
Our present research can confirm that advisors behave strate-
gically. However, our results provide an extension of previous
research and suggest that strategic behavior has an explicit and
an implicit facet. Finally, we can state that the implicit strate-
gic behavior is crucial because it can partly explain the explicit
strategic behavior.
LIMITATIONS
The reader should be aware that in Study 2 our manipula-
tion for accountability did not work. Therefore, our simple
slope analyses are also based on correlative data (including also
self-interest, experimental self-interest was less convincing). As
already discussed, one reason might be that in participants con-
fronted with the manipulation higher responsibility was salient,
which weakened the effect regarding the experimental self-interest
and differentiation between conflicting and supporting informa-
tion compared to Study 1. However, we could find convincing
findings with simple slope analysis, which is a state-of-the-art
analysis for moderation effects. Still, it is a limitation to use
correlative data because there can be confounds which we are
not aware of. Therefore, in future research it will be essen-
tial to manipulate accountability and at the same time self-
interest successfully, so that results can be based on experimental
manipulation.
A further limitation is that we used students and not real advi-
sors. There is for example evidence, that real experts (physicians)
search longer for an alternative explanation and could therefore
reduce errors compared to novice (Krems and Zierer, 1994). How-
ever, there are also “costs of expertise”: Experts who decided for
an alternative were more rigid and did not change their decisions
easily (Sternberg, 1996). These findings indicate that especially for
the practical implications it would be essential to test our hypoth-
esis also with real advisors. Furthermore, regarding incentives it
can be further essential to test an incentive that is common in this
business and the real field of advisors.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In many advisor–client interactions incentives as explicit moti-
vator are part of the business. Companies want to control the
interests of the advisors and match them with their interests. For
instance, even physicians, who are highly responsible for their
clients, are in this situation. When physicians are rewarded with
gifts or even get paid when supporting the interests of phar-
maceutical companies (e.g., recommending a certain medication,
referrals to clinical trials) they are at risk to behave strategically.
This approach implies the risk that advisors clearly and explicitly
subordinate the needs of the customer to their self-interest. Well,
the explicit self-interested behavior aroused by incentives is known
and in a way desired in this business sector of the pharmaceuti-
cal companies. Furthermore, for physicians this explicit strategic
behavior seems maybe controllable and they feel not influenced
in their objectivity. But based on our results self-interest is not
limited to explicit and conscious acting. Moreover, the influence
of incentives goes a step further and already influences their eval-
uation when searching and thinking about the best medication
for their client and moreover they can later remember conflict-
ing information regarding the medication worse. Our findings
strongly indicate that advisors do not act independently of their
more implicit processes of information processing. The implicit
strategic behavior entail a high risk for clients and also for advi-
sors’ themselves. It might be especially crucial how incentives are
used. The promise of incentive connected with a certain alter-
native or product showed in our study evidence for deception.
Based on the use of incentive within this study, strategic behav-
ior might be especially high because of the connection between
the incentive and a certain alternative (product engineer) or prod-
uct, such as a certain medication. Further research in this field
would be necessary to investigate different forms of providing
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incentives and how this lead to explicit, and implicit strategic
behavior.
CONCLUSION
In order to improve the understanding of deception our results
indicated to take explicit and implicit strategic behavior into
account. Advisors gave recommendation and transfer of infor-
mation in self-interested strategic manner to deceive the client.
The advisors also biased the information processing which can
be seen as an implicit strategic way to deceive the client.
Furthermore, the fact that the advisor should justify his/her
recommendation even increased strategic behavior – explicit as
well as implicit.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Information regarding the job alternatives differentiating between supporting and conflicting information regarding the client’s and
the advisor’s interest.
Information regarding. . . Mechatronic engineer Product engineer Machinery engineer
Client Advisora Client Advisor Client Advisor
Job characteristics +b −b − − + −
Career opportunities Neutral Neutral + + + −
Further professional development + − + + + −
Salary + − − − − +
Competence needs + − − − − +
Labor-market situation + − + + − +
aFor further analysis supporting and conflicting refer always to the advisor’s interest;
b+ supporting, − conflicting.
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